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In this paper, we investigate how ﬁrm reporting incentives and institutional factors affect
accounting quality in ﬁrms from 26 countries. We exploit a unique multicountry setting where ﬁrms
are required to comply with the same set of international reporting standards. We develop an
approach of cross-country comparisons allowing for differences between ﬁrms within a country and
we investigate the relative importance of country- versus ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors in explaining
accounting quality. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong
monitoring mechanisms by means of ownership concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing,
external ﬁnancing needs, and leverage. Instability of business operations, existence of losses, and
lack of transparent disclosure negatively affect the quality of accounting information. At the country
level, we observe better accounting quality for ﬁrms from regulatory environments with stronger
institutions, higher levels of economic development, greater business sophistication, and more
globalized markets. More importantly, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm-speciﬁc incentives play a greater role in
explaining accounting quality than countrywide factors. This evidence suggests that institutional
factors shape the ﬁrm's speciﬁc incentives that inﬂuence reporting quality. Our ﬁndings support the
view that the global adoption of a single set of accounting standards in isolation is not likely to lead to
more comparable and transparent ﬁnancial statements unless the institutional conditions and the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc reporting incentives also change.
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This study is motivated by the debate about the influences of institutional and economic
forces, firm-specific reporting incentives, and accounting standards on financial reporting
outcomes (e.g., Holthausen, 2003, 2009; Schipper, 2005; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). A
large bulk of the international literature contributing to this debate focuses on the role of
institutional and economic incentives in determining the quality of accounting numbers
(e.g. Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006;
Land & Lang, 2002). As international markets integrate, it becomes increasingly important
to understand to what extent a variation in the institutional setting is reflected on the
variation of the quality of financial reporting processes across firms from different
countries (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). However, these prior studies have
difficulty examining how institutionally shaped reporting incentives affect financial
reporting outcomes when these outcomes are influenced simultaneously by accounting
standards and by reporting incentives. For example, Schipper (2005) emphasizes that
accounting numbers are materially affected by what standards require and by reporting
incentives when preparers try to achieve some desired financial reporting outcome.
Holthausen (2003), Schipper (2005), and others argue that when institutional factors, firm
incentives, and accounting standards vary simultaneously, it is difficult to isolate their
individual effects on the properties of accounting information. However, many
international studies do not examine the effects of institutional factors (at a country
level) and company reporting incentives (at a firm level) on financial reporting in a setting
with constant accounting standards. Following Holthausen (2003) and Schipper (2005),
we investigate the quality of accounting outcomes in a context where the direction and
strength of institutional factors and firm reporting incentives vary but accounting standards
remain constant. We are aware of only one other study that attempts a similar approach:
Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003). This study analyzes earnings' timeliness and conservatism in
Asian countries with similar accounting regulations. It infers that incentives and
institutional factors dominate accounting standards as determinants of financial reporting.
The study (2003) tacitly assumes that the standards are of high quality. However, the
standards and their quality vary across these Asian countries. They are only similar in their
Anglo-Saxon origin and they are also of an uncertain quality (Holthausen, 2003). Our
research design addresses this issue and builds a framework which places international
firms on a level playing field in terms of mandatory accounting standards. Mandatory
adoption of IFRS across a large number of jurisdictions provides not similar but identical
standards of a high quality.1 Specifically, we analyze institutionally-shaped reporting
incentives of a set of firms from 26 countries reporting under the same mandated
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to see the effects on firms' financial
reporting outcomes.
Moreover, we build on Holthausen's (2003) comment regarding the need for more
quantitative analysis in cross-country comparison. We develop an approach of country
classification. In contrast to Ball et al. (2003), who treat the four Asian countries as a1 The high quality of IFRS is evidenced by the IASC's Improvements Project and the International Organization
of Securities Commissions's (IOSCO) endorsement in the case of EU adoption of IFRS (Schipper, 2005).
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sample consists of firms from a wide range of institutional, economic, and capital market
contexts. This multidimensional approach enables us to base our classification on
seventeen country-level dimensions and to develop more powerful tests of the association
between countrywide factors and accounting quality.
In addition to country-level institutional factors, institutional factors shape the complex
set of firm-level incentives, which determine the financial reporting outcomes. As a result,
we do not treat firms in the same country homogenously; rather, we allow for differences
across firms within a country (Holthausen, 2003). By refining the comparison of
international firms to firm-level variation, we allow for the possibility that firms might
mitigate or undo the effects of their country-specific institutional arrangements. While
prior research (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 2006) suggests that institutional factors have a role
in shaping the reporting behavior of firms, they offer little insight into the relative
importance of firm- versus country-specific factors on reporting quality. For example, Leuz
et al. (2003) and Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) show that financial
reporting quality is influenced by legal, economic, and enforcement elements of the firm's
environment. However, the authors do not show whether these country forces affect
financial reporting outcomes, or, instead, if they shape firms' particular incentives such as
international diversification, ownership structure, and auditor quality, which in turn
influences reporting quality. Thus, the present analysis can help clarify previously
inconclusive evidence regarding the extent to which accounting quality is determined by
firm incentives and institutional conditions. Accounting quality is difficult to observe and
thus difficult to measure. We rely on two measures widely used in previous accounting
research (e.g., Easton & Harris, 1991; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004). The
first is a market-based measure that captures the relation between stock returns and
accounting earnings. The main critique of market-based proxies of accounting quality is
that, although these measures are usually employed to test the quality of accounting
standards, they actually reflect both the effect of accounting standards and institutional
factors (see, Holthausen & Watts, 2001). In our research design accounting standards are
held constant, therefore we do not face the difficulty of unraveling the relative influences
of these factors. The second proxy is purely dependent on accounting numbers and
measures the relation between accruals and cash flows. We test empirically the relative
impact of a broad range of firm and institutional factors on the two accounting measures.
The sample comprises 7854 firm-year observations from 26 countries for the years 2006
and 2007. Although using only two years limits our empirical tests, it ensures that IFRS is
the mandatory set of standards used across all firms as our research design requires. We
find that accounting quality is positively associated with ownership structure, analyst
scrutiny, audit fees, external financing needs, and leverage. Instability of business
operations, existence of losses, and lack of transparent disclosure negatively affect the
quality of accounting information. At the country level, our findings indicate that firms
exhibit better quality financial reporting if they are domiciled in countries with higher
levels of economic and institutional development, with greater business sophistication, and
with greater integration in the global economy.
Our findings have important economic implications. The results suggest that
firm-specific incentives reflect a significant part of institutional and economic conditions.
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to result in desired achievements in financial reporting if changes to the countries' overall
institutional and economic infrastructures are brought about simultaneously with actions
that impact firms' reporting incentives. For example, improvements in capital market
development at a macro level might not be sufficient to enhance the quality of financial
reporting substantially unless the corporate governance structures at a firm level also
improve to facilitate the efficient implementation of country-level measures. Firm
managers and investors will also benefit from understanding which firm incentives are
likely to affect reporting outcomes. For example, if audit quality is more important than
analyst scrutiny, then managers might prefer investing resources in hiring better auditors to
improving relations with the analyst community.
The international efforts by the IASB and the FASB to improve accounting standards
worldwide (e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the FASB and the IASB, 2006)
are expected to result in more comparable and transparent reporting. Our findings support
the view that this goal can only be realized if the institutional factors that shape firm
reporting incentives are also improved (e.g., Holthausen, 2009; Schipper, 2005). Our
results suggest that the global accounting debate should focus not only on convergence of
accounting standards but also on the market forces and institutional factors that shape
firm-specific reporting incentives (e.g., Leuz, 2003).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the accounting
harmonization, firm incentives, and institutional factors included in the analysis. Section 3
describes the research design. Section 4 presents the data and empirical results. Section 5
concludes.
2. Accounting harmonization, diversity of firms' incentives, and institutional factors
International firms have adopted IFRS in an attempt to harmonize accounting standards.
IFRS adoption has raised expectations that reporting quality will increase across
jurisdictions and will lead to more consistent and reliable results. Although research
shows that high-quality standards (i.e., IFRS) generally improve accounting quality (Barth,
Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Daske, Luzi, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008a), other evidence suggests
that standards have a limited role for determining financial reporting quality (Burgstahler et
al., 2006; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008b; Leuz, 2003). Rather, the conditions in which
a firm operates determine financial reporting outcomes. For example, ownership structure
and the degree of business internationalization have a significant influence on reporting
quality (see Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). At the country level,
several institutional factors are known to affect financial reporting quality, including the
quality of the legal system, the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, and the
development of capital markets (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Soderstrom &
Sun, 2007). Institutional factors vary across countries, hence global implementation of
IFRS per se might not lead to the desired improvements and similarity in financial
reporting outcomes across jurisdictions (see Holthausen, 2009; Leuz et al., 2003). In
addition, the implementation of a single set of standards in a particular country might not
have homogenous effects on all firms in that economy. IFRS permits enough judgment to
let managers' reporting choices affect accounting numbers. Managers' choices are strongly
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forces, ownership structures, enforcement mechanisms, and auditors' incentives. Thus, to
explain financial reporting quality in an international context, we must consider a variety of
firm-level reporting incentives in addition to country-level economic and institutional
factors (Holthausen, 2003). In order to understand the effects of these two types of factors,
we must isolate them from the effects of differences in accounting standards (Schipper,
2005). To do so, we investigate the country and firm determinants of financial reporting
quality in jurisdictions that follow the same set of mandatory accounting standards.
Specifically, we make use of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 26 countries to test the
relative influence of institutional factors and firm incentives on properties of accounting
information. This framework guarantees constant standards across firms and it avoids the
need to judge subjectively which regimes have similar accounting standards.2 A vast
number of research papers have analyzed the interactions between firm and country
factors. For example, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) and Francis, Khurana, Martin, and
Pereira (2008) show that firm-specific incentives play a more important role in determining
accounting quality in countries with a stronger institutional environment. On the other
hand, evidence reported by Covrig, Defond, and Hung (2007) and Durnev and Kim (2005)
shows that firm-specific incentives are more important for financial reporting when firms
operate in poor legal and information environments. However, these studies cannot
provide definitive evidence on the relative role of country and firm factors on accounting
quality because the set of firms analyzed have varying degrees of accounting standards
either through time or cross-sectionally. Furthermore, these studies allow for variation
across countries using a single-dimension (e.g., legal environment). They also observe the
behavior of firm-level incentives across a single criterion (e.g., weak versus strong legal
environment). Our study considers a wide range of institutional, economic, and
technological country-level metrics and it allows firm-level variation in reporting
incentives while it keeps reporting standards fixed. This approach clarifies the relative
role of institutional versus firm incentives on financial reporting outcomes.
2.1. Firm incentives
2.1.1. Listing in U.S. markets
The cross-listing literature shows that cross-listed firms generally have better
information quality than their non-U.S. listed peers (e.g., Bradshaw, Bushee, & Miller,
2004; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003a; Lang, Raedy, &
Wilson, 2006; Lang, Raedy, & Yetman, 2003b). Firms choose to cross list in order to
attract external funds, to draw the attention of sophisticated investors, and to increase
visibility and reputation. These factors positively affect financial reporting quality. But
since the decision to cross list in the U.S. is voluntary, we question whether improvements
in accounting quality should be attributed to cross listing or to another underlying factor
(e.g., Doidge et al., 2004). Given these arguments, we make no prediction regarding the
sign of the relation between accounting quality and listing in the U.S. markets. We measure2 Several studies benchmark the accounting standards with U.S. standards (e.g., Ali & Hwang, 2000). But as
observed by Holthausen (2003), there is no consensus about the superiority of U.S. standards.
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lists in U.S. markets (via ADR), and zero otherwise.
2.1.2. International business diversification
International research shows that interactions with foreign markets are associated with
greater transparency and better disclosure (e.g., Khanna, Palepu, & Srinivasan, 2004).
Firms that have diversified operations abroad have greater incentives to provide
comprehensive financial information to their foreign clients, suppliers, and potential
investors. Therefore, we include a firm-level variable that captures the level of international
business diversification: the log of the number of geographical segments (GEOSEG). We
hypothesize that a higher level of international diversification results in better reporting
quality.
2.1.3. Ownership concentration
Ownership structures vary considerably around the world (e.g., Faccio & Lang, 2002;
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Thus, it is critical to account for such
variation in international studies. Ownership also has a significant effect on the quality of
accounting numbers. When ownership is concentrated in the hands of investors capable of
and willing to exercise effective monitoring, accounting numbers are typically more
relevant and reliable (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Durnev &
Kim, 2005; Velury & Jenkins, 2006). Ownership concentration has an association with
closer alignment of interests between insiders and outsiders and with better governance
practices, which are expected to result in better financial reporting. Consequently, we
expect to observe a positive relation between ownership concentration and our measures of
accounting quality. We measure ownership concentration (OWNER) as the percentage of
closely held shares in a firm.3
2.1.4. Transparency of disclosure
Transparent (clear and precise) disclosure is difficult to measure and previous research
has used a variety of methods such as analyst scores and self-developed indices. But
analysts' disclosure scores typically include only large firms (mostly U.S. ones), and
research-made scores are subjective and time-consuming. For these reasons, we focus on
measures that capture the consequences of transparent disclosure: the reduction in
information asymmetry that translates into increased liquidity (e.g., Bushee & Leuz, 2005;
Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000) and the reduction in uncertainty and diversity of opinion that
affects trading volume (e.g., Bamber, Barron, & Stober, 1997; Linsmeier, Thornton,
Venkatachalam, & Welker, 2002). To capture both the liquidity and volume effects, we
combine the average bid–ask spread and the average change in trading volume (TDISC) by
using a principal component analysis. Bid–ask spread is calculated as the absolute difference
between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the spread (e.g., Bushee &3 The deﬁnition of closely held shares given in Worldscope is as follows: (1) shares held by ofﬁcers, directors,
and their immediate families; (2) shares held in trust; (3) shares of the company held by any other corporation
(except shares held in a ﬁduciary capacity by banks or other ﬁnancial institutions); (4) shares held by pension/
beneﬁt plans; and (5) shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares.
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in the log of number of shares traded (e.g., Leuz, Triantis, & Wang, 2008). Both measures
represent the averages over the last fiscal year. We expect clear and transparent information to
be associated with lower bid–ask spreads and lower changes in trading volume. Thus, we
anticipate a negative relation between TDISC and accounting quality.
2.1.5. Analyst activity
Accounting and finance literature suggests that analysts use accounting information to
value the firm and predict future cash flows (e.g., Hope, 2003a,b). By extensively using
and scrutinizing financial information, analysts create pressure for firms to report better
financial information (e.g., Fang, 2008; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003a). We consider two
aspects of analyst activity: forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the firm.
We reduce the two into a single measure (ANALYST) using a principal component
analysis. We define analyst forecast accuracy as Hope (2003a) does: the negative of the
absolute difference between actual earnings per share and the annual average of analysts'
forecasts of one-year ahead of earnings, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the
fiscal year end. The number of analysts following is calculated as the annual average of the
number of analysts providing one-year ahead earnings forecasts. We hypothesize a positive
relation between ANALYST and accounting quality.
2.1.6. Auditor quality
Agency problems between managers and investors can be mitigated through contracting
that often relies on accounting numbers. Contracting creates a demand for competent and
independent monitoring of accounting information personified in high-quality audit
services (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The link between audit quality and financial
reporting quality is well documented (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Barton,
2005), but empirical findings are contradictory. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) argue
that there is a negative relation between fees paid for non-audit services (an indication of
auditor dependence on the firm) and earnings quality. On the other hand, Larcker and
Richardson (2004) find higher earnings quality in firms where auditors have great financial
dependence. The quality of auditing services also varies internationally due to differences
in businesses, litigation, and reputation across countries (e.g., Francis, Khurana, & Pereira,
2003; Khurana & Raman, 2004). We expect to see cross-sectional variation in the
effectiveness of auditing in monitoring financial statement information prepared under
IFRS. But given previous contradictory findings, we make no directional prediction for this
association. We measure the effectiveness of auditing services as the proportion of total
audit fees paid relative to the firm's total assets (AUDFEE).
2.1.7. Firm-level book-tax alignment
There is significant variation in the influence of income taxes on accounting numbers
across the world (e.g., Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). Even within European Union countries
that have made efforts to establish common corporate tax strategies, there are still
significant differences in taxation.4 Previous studies, such as Ali and Hwang (2000),4 For a review of the taxation differences in Europe see European Commission (2006).
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likely to reflect underlying economic activities in countries with close book-tax alignment.
Further, Hanlon, Laplante, and Shevlin (2005) find that individual firms make use of
taxation in different ways. This produces cross-firm variation in tax-book alignment within
the same country. Thus we expect the influence of tax rules on the quality of reported
accounting numbers to be firm specific.5 Following Hanlon et al. (2005), we calculate
tax-book alignment (TAXBOOK) as the log of the squared difference between pre-tax
book income and taxable income, where taxable income is calculated as tax expense
divided by the tax rate in the country. We anticipate that a close book-tax alignment
muddles firms' incentives to report true economic performance and thus we expect a
negative influence from TAXBOOK on accounting quality.2.1.8. Variability of business operations
Higher uncertainty about business operations implies more management judgments and
estimation errors that can hinder the quality of financial reporting. Dechow and Dichev
(2002) observe that accounting quality declines with a longer operating cycle, higher sales
volatility, and a higher cash flow volatility. Consistent with the idea that lower reporting
quality negatively impacts the cost of capital, Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005b) find
that higher business uncertainty increases a firm's cost of equity capital. We measure the
variability of business operations (STSALE) as an indicator variable that takes the value of
one if the standard deviation of firm sales is above the corresponding industry median, and
zero otherwise. We expect higher variability in business operations to have an association
with lower accounting quality.2.1.9. Economic distress
Losses are typically interpreted as a sign of economic distress for a business. Literature
as far back as Ball and Brown (1968) documents a negative market reaction to bad news
about earnings. To avoid such a negative reaction, managers purposely manage financial
information to portray a better image of business performance (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev,
1997), thus reducing the quality of accounting information. Information prepared during
loss years is more likely to contain estimation errors because managers might have to
predict unusual items (e.g., restructuring costs) or changing accounting policies (Dechow
& Dichev, 2002). For these reasons, we expect the incidence of losses to be negatively
associated with accounting quality. Incidence of losses (NLOSS) is calculated as the
number of years of losses relative to the total number of years (as in Dechow & Dichev,
2002).5 Typically, ﬁrms calculate income tax based on individual ﬁnancial statements prepared under local standards.
In this study, we focus on information prepared under IFRS that applies only to consolidated ﬁnancial statements.
However, IFRS-based consolidated ﬁnancial statements can be affected by ﬁrm tax incentives for two reasons.
First, in some countries tax legislation allows ﬁrms to pay corporate taxes at the consolidation level (for example
in the EU in groups where capital participations are above 90%). Second, policy choices on individual accounts
that are driven by tax considerations are likely to be kept in the consolidated reports.
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External financial needs have been identified as an important determinant of financial
reporting quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2008; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Leuz, 2003). Firms with
abundant growth opportunities and insufficient internal funds have incentives to increase
the quality of financial information as a way to obtain funds at favorable conditions. We
measure external financing needs (FINEED) as the difference between the required
investment to keep the firm growing and the proportion of firm's earnings that are
reinvested (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). The required investment to grow is
calculated as the two-year average growth in total assets, and the proportion of reinvested
earnings is calculated as the two-year average ROE / (1−ROE), similarly to Leuz et al.
(2008). Consistent with previous arguments, we expect a positive association between
external financing needs and accounting quality.
2.1.11. Size, leverage and industry
We control for industry differences using industry indicator variables based on 1-digit
SIC codes. As a robustness check, we use a two-digit SIC code and the Fama and French
(1997) industry classification. These alternative criteria result in an uneven distribution of
observations by groups; thus, we prefer the former.
The existence of debt can be an important governance mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny,
1997). Debt forces managers to generate cash flows to pay interest and the principal,
mitigating agency conflicts created by free cash flows. It also increases demand for
credible financial reporting as a way to monitor debt contracts. The counter-argument is
that excess debt can create incentives to manipulate accounting numbers in order to meet
debt commitments (Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Thus we do not state a prior prediction for
the effect of debt on accounting quality. We use the debt-to-assets ratio to calculate
financial leverage (LEV).
Another important determinant of accounting quality is firm size. However, we do not
include a size variable in our empirical tests because size is already captured (and thus
correlated) with some of the other variables. For example, analysts following and audit fees
are usually associated with firm size (e.g., Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003a; Larcker &
Richardson, 2004).
2.2. Institutional and economic factors
2.2.1. Institutional environment
Prior evidence suggests that the quality of accounting numbers is influenced by the legal
environment (e.g., Lang et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003; Pincus et al., 2007; Soderstrom & Sun,
2007), the level of investor protection, and the importance of equity markets (e.g., Ali &
Hwang, 2000; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Hung, 2001; Leuz et al., 2003). With the mandatory
adoption of IFRS, legal enforcement assumes particular relevance because the issuing body
(IASB— International Accounting Standards Board) does not have enforcement power. That
power resides in the regulators and the courts of the specific jurisdiction. Thus, the institutional
and legal environment in which the firm operates are crucial in shaping financial reporting
outcomes. Accordingly, we expect institutional quality to be positively associated with
accounting quality. We measure the quality of institutional and regulatory environment using
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law (RULAW), regulatory quality (REGQUAL), government effectiveness (GOVEFF), and
control of corruption (CONCORR). Scores vary between−2.5 and 2.5 and higher scores reflect
countries with higher quality institutions.
2.2.2. Importance of capital markets
When capital is provided mostly by numerous small investors, accounting information is
usually more accurate and transparent because finance providers rely on public information to
make investment decisions. On the other hand, firms have incentives to disclose high-quality
information in order to attract a wider pool of investors to finance their projects. The relation
between sources of finance and the quality of accounting information is well documented in
Ali and Hwang (2000), Bradshaw et al. (2004), Burgstahler et al. (2006), Dargenidou,
McLeay, and Raonic (2006), Joos and Lang (1994) and Leuz et al. (2003). For example,
Bradshaw et al. argue that institutional and foreign investors prefer high-quality financial
statements when making international investments. Similar to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2006), we use the log of the average ratio of the number of domestic firm listed
in a country to its population (DOMFIRM) over the period 1997 to 2007, and the average
percentage of the total market capitalization to the country's GDP over the period 1997 to
2007 (MCTOGDP) as proxies for capital market importance.We anticipate a positive relation
between the capital market measure and accounting quality.
2.2.3. Economic development and competitiveness
The quality of financial reporting also has an association with the country's level of
economic development (e.g., Doidge et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2008). Usually the
literature relies on a country's GDP as a measure of economic development. In this study,
we consider a more comprehensive set of factors intended to capture the complexity of the
country's degree of development. Notably, we derive nine variables from the Global
Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, 2007) that measure the countries'
productivity and growth potential. We consider the following variables: (1) institutions
(INST), which capture the government attitudes toward markets and ethical practices in
business dealings; (2) macro economy (MACROEC), which captures the country's
economic stability; (3) higher education and training (HEDT), which measures the quality
of education and on-the-job training; (4) goods market efficiency (GOODMAREF), which
reflects the healthy market competition (i.e. ensuring that the most efficient firms are those
that survive); (5) financial market sophistication (FINMARSOPH), which measures
the ability of the financial sector to channel resources to the best entrepreneurs;
(6) technological readiness (TECHREAD), which assesses the agility with which a country
adopts existing technologies; (7) market size (MARSIZE), which includes both domestic
and foreign markets; (8) business sophistication (BUSOPH), which reflects the quality of
the country's business networks and supporting industries; and (9) innovation (INN),
which is related to the country's ability to develop cutting-edge products and processes to
maintain a competitive edge and high productivity. The scores vary from one to seven with
higher values allocated to countries with a higher degree of development. Consistent with
previous findings, we hypothesize that economic development and competition have a
positive effect on firms' reporting quality.
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We extend previous work that shows an association between cross-border economic
interactions and disclosure quality (e.g., Khanna et al., 2004). We expect a country's
interaction with foreign markets to have a positive influence on the quality of financial
information. We control for a country's product market interaction with businesses abroad
and construct a variable for foreign trade (FOREIGNTR) computed as the sum of exports
and imports divided by the country's GDP.
2.2.5. Differences between countries' local GAAP and IFRS
We acknowledge that the degree of prior similarity between domestic GAAP and IFRS
may still be reflected in accounting quality after the mandatory switch to IFRS. For example,
a firm's financial reporting might have higher quality due to the fact that the firm is domiciled
in a country that has already experienced a high degree of alignment with IFRS prior to the
compulsory switch. Recall that we aim to study accounting quality in a setting where
accounting standards are unique and constant across all firms. Thus, we control for ex ante
similarities between domestic GAAP and IFRS. We include the differences index developed
by Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008). The index is a summary score measured on 21 key
accounting dimensions where higher scores represent more differences between domestic
GAAP and IFRS. We multiply this measure by minus one so that the higher values represent
less ex ante differences (DIFFER). We expect a positive effect of ex ante similarities between
domestic GAAP and IFRS on accounting quality. That is because we take the view that IFRS
generally improves reporting quality (e.g., Barth et al., 2008).
3. Research design
3.1. Measures of accounting quality
The quality of accounting numbers is difficult to observe. Thus, there is no consensus on
the best way to measure it. Some authors focus on the market perspective by looking at
earnings' value relevance and timeliness (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Francis & Schipper, 1999;
Joos & Lang, 1994). Others rely on accounting-based measures that do not depend on market
perceptions such as earnings management, smoothing, and persistence (e.g., Burgstahler et
al., 2006; Francis et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003).We attempt to balance these two perspectives
by using a market-based and an accounting-based measure of accounting quality. The first
measure (AQ1) captures relevance of earnings information to stock market investors. The
second measure (AQ2) reflects how earnings are affected by managers' accrual choices.
Although these accounting quality proxies may not be universally accepted, previous
literature has used them widely. Also, the two-year time frame (necessary to ensure that IFRS
is mandatory across all countries) limits the type of accounting measures that we can
implement.
Following previous research, notably Barth et al. (2008), Easton and Harris (1991),
Francis et al. (2004) and Francis and Schipper (1999), we construct the first proxy for
accounting quality (AQ1) by fitting the following model:
RETi;t ¼ α0 þα1EARi;t þ α2ΔEARi;t þ εi;t; ð1Þ
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6
EAR is earnings before extraordinary items and preferred dividends, scaled by the beginning of
fiscal year tmarket value of equity for firm i.ΔEAR is the change in EAR from fiscal year t−1
to t deflated by the beginning of fiscal year t market value of equity for firm i.7
For each firm and year, we obtain the absolute residuals of regression (1).8 The residual
term is the component of RET that is not determined by EAR andΔEAR. Its larger magnitude
in absolute terms indicates that accounting numbers are less able to explain variation in stock
returns. Thus, it indicates lower quality in accounting numbers. We define our measure of
accounting quality as the negative of the absolute value of the residual term from
regression (1), so that its greater (less negative) values represent better quality9:
AQ1 ¼ −abs εi;t
 
: ð2Þ
The second proxy for accounting quality (AQ2) follows Burgstahler et al. (2006) and
Francis et al. (2004) and shows how the magnitude of total accruals deviates from cash
flows from operations. It is based on the idea that cash flows from operations capture
firms' underlying economic performance and that firms can use accruals to manage
earnings. It is measured as the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute
value of cash flow from operations (CFO).10 Larger values of the ratio imply greater
earnings manipulation. We multiply the ratio by minus one so that higher values (less
negative) represent better accounting quality:
AQ2 ¼ − abs total accrualsð Þ
abs CFOð Þ : ð3Þ
3.2. Data, sample, and summary statistics
The sample consists of non-financial firms in 26 countries that adopted IFRS by 2005
for which data is available. We use data for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 for a maximum of
7854 firm-year observations.11 We remove observations falling in the top or bottom 1% of
the distribution for stock price returns and earnings to reduce the effect of outliers on the6 To account for accounting periods not equal to one ﬁscal year, we match the observed returns with
corresponding accounting year ends and annualize the return ﬁgures to a standard 15-month, accordingly.
7 For clarity, we suppress the variable subscripts throughout the rest of the text.
8 Adding industry effects and/or country effects to Eq. (1) yields similar empirical results.
9 An alternative measure is the explanatory power (R2) of rolling window time-series regressions as in Francis et
al. (2004). However, that procedure requires a relatively long time-series of data that is not available for our study.
It has also been criticized for biasing the measure in favor of successful and surviving ﬁrms. Alternatively, we
could estimate R2's from cross-sectional industry regressions. However, small sample sizes in many industry
groups do not permit it.
10 Accruals are calculated as follows: Δcurrent assets−Δcash−Δcurrent liabilities+Δshort-term debt−depreciation.
11 We do not include year 2005 to ensure that only mandatory adopters of IFRS are included in the sample. The
mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe (and other countries) took place in 2005, thus for certain ﬁrms with ﬁscal
year end different from 31st December the adoption of IFRS occurs only in year 2006. Excluding 2005 also
guarantees that accounting numbers are not affected by one-time transition items that may distort our measures of
accounting quality.
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missing data. A December fiscal year-end restriction is not applied and therefore
companies that have reporting periods other than for the calendar year are included.
Accounting and market data is collected from Worldscope and Datastream. Analyst data is
from I/B/E/S. Country variables are obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2007), the Federation
of European Securities Exchange (2007), the World Bank (2008), the World Economic
Forum (2007), and the World Federation of Exchanges (2008). Data on cross-listings are
from the Bank of New York Mellon (2008). Tax rates are from the European Commission
(2006) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008). Mean values of firm variables and country
factors for each individual country are reported in Table 1.
The number of firm-years ranges from a minimum of six for Venezuela to a maximum
of 1654 for Australia.13 As expected, firms vary considerably across countries in terms of
fundamental characteristics such as geographic dispersion, ownership structure, and
leverage. For example, Panel A of Table 1 reveals that ownership is more concentrated in
the Czech Republic and the Philippines; and that Portuguese and Spanish firms have the
highest proportion of debt. Panel B reveals that Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and
Sweden), the U.K., Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore, and Hong Kong have higher
institutional quality and economic development. The largest capital markets (market
capitalization to GDP) can be found in Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Luxembourg,
Switzerland, and the U.K.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables in the regression analysis. The
average firm generates earnings equivalent to 5% of market value at the beginning of the
period, has 35% of closely owned shares, pays approximately 1% of total assets for audit
services, and its assets are 21% debt financed. Results also suggest cross-firm variation in
disclosure transparency and analyst activity.
Pairwise correlations presented in Table 3 indicate generally low correlations between
firm-incentive variables. The highest correlations are for ANALYST with variables
STSALE (0.37), USLIST (0.40) and GEOSEG (0.29). These correlations are in keeping
with previous research (e.g., Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003a) showing that firms with
international exposure and cross-listing in the U.S. are more likely to be followed closely
by analysts. Not surprisingly, the correlations between country factors are usually high and
statistically significant.
Given the degree to which institutional, economic, and market conditions tend to move
together, we employ a factor analysis using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure to
identify underlying commonalities among sample countries. The factor analysis (not
tabulated) indicates three common factors. We rotate the factors using varimax rotation to
clarify the interpretation of factor loadings.12 Other methods to deal with outlier observations yield similar conclusions. In particular, we have considered
the following: elimination of 1% top/bottom for all ﬁnancial variables; elimination of extreme inﬂuential
observations using Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) cut-off value. We choose to eliminate the 1% top/bottom
deletion of observations for variables in the ﬁrst regression model because it has less impact in the number of
observations.
13 The relative low number of observations for some countries (e.g., Hong Kong) is a consequence of the low
number of ﬁrms identiﬁed in Worldscope as following IFRS in the period analyzed.
Table 1
Variable means by country.
This table reports the variable means for 26 countries using IFRS standards in 2006 and 2007. AQ1 measures accounting quality as the negative of the absolute value of
residuals from a regression of 15-month stock returns on earnings and earnings changes. AQ2 measures accounting quality as the negative of the ratio of the absolute value
of total accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from operations. Accruals are calculated as follows: Δcurrent assets−Δcash−Δcurrent liabilities+Δshort-term debt−
depreciation. USLIST is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a firm lists in a U.S. market, or zero otherwise. GEOSEG is the log of the number of geographical segments.
OWNER is the percentage of closely held shares. TDISC is the first principal component of the annual average bid–ask spread and the change in the annual average trading
volume. ANALYST is the first principal component of analyst forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the firm. AUDFEE is the ratio of total audit fees to
total assets. TAXBOOK is the log of the squared difference between pre-tax book income and taxable income (tax expense divided by the tax rate in the country). STSALE
is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the standard deviation of the firm's sales in the last two years is above the corresponding industry median, and zero otherwise. NLOSS
is the proportion of years of losses. FINEED is the required investment to grow (two-year average growth in total assets) minus the proportion of earnings that are
reinvested (two-year average ROE/ (1−ROE)). LEV is the ratio of debt to total assets. INST is the country's score for government attitude to markets. MACROEC is the
country's score for macroeconomic stability. HEDT is the country's score for level of education. GOODMAREF is a country score for market efficiency in competition.
FINMARSOPH is a country score for financial market sophistication. TECHREAD is the country's score for technological readiness. MARSIZE is the country's score for
market size. BUSOPH is the country's score for business sophistication. INN is the country's score for innovation. CONCORR is the country's score for control of
corruption. GOVEFF is the country's score for government effectiveness. REGQUAL is the country's score for regulatory quality. RULAW is the country's score for rule
of law. MCTOGDP is the average ratio of the country's total market capitalization to its GDP in the period 1997 to 2007. DOMFIRM is the log of the average ratio of the
number of domestic firms listed in a country to its population (in millions) for the period 1997 to 2007. FOREIGNTR is the ratio of the country's exports plus imports to
GDP. DIFFER is Bae et al.'s (2008) country score of difference between the country's local GAAP and IFRS based on 21 accounting characteristics.
Panel A: dependent and firm-level variables
N AQ1 AQ2 USLIST GEOSEG OWNER TDISC ANALYST AUDFEE TAXBOOK STSALE NLOSS FINEED LEV
Australia 1654 −0.50 −4.50 0.06 0.30 0.39 0.35 −0.34 0.02 −0.14 0.34 0.52 0.02 0.14
Austria 94 −0.35 −0.76 0.20 1.16 0.51 0.00 −0.11 0.00 −0.01 0.66 0.07 0.00 0.24
Belgium 136 −0.26 −2.00 0.05 0.87 0.51 −0.18 −0.03 0.00 0.01 0.53 0.15 0.00 0.24
Czech Republic 16 −0.21 −0.47 0.08 0.33 0.81 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.02 0.00 0.13
Denmark 157 −0.40 −1.43 0.04 0.90 0.44 −0.24 −0.05 0.00 −0.01 0.53 0.15 0.00 0.25
Finland 207 −0.29 −2.95 0.05 1.08 0.31 −0.18 0.25 0.00 −0.03 0.56 0.16 0.00 0.22
France 715 −0.33 −1.54 0.08 0.80 0.54 −0.20 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.57 0.11 0.00 0.22
Germany 790 −0.34 −5.16 0.06 0.89 0.50 −0.34 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.16 0.00 0.18
Greece 297 −0.39 −1.76 0.03 0.46 0.57 0.19 −0.13 0.00 −0.02 0.54 0.16 0.01 0.28
Hong Kong 62 −0.49 −1.06 0.15 0.83 0.64 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.45 0.14 0.00 0.17
Hungary 29 −0.42 −0.73 0.37 0.97 0.57 −0.01 −0.07 0.00 0.04 0.60 0.12 0.00 0.12
Ireland 65 −0.41 −0.95 0.18 0.47 0.29 0.00 −0.11 0.00 −0.06 0.63 0.26 0.00 0.21
Italy 301 −0.35 −7.21 0.07 0.87 0.53 −0.28 0.07 0.00 −0.01 0.68 0.17 0.00 0.27
Luxembourg 26 −0.41 −0.71 0.06 1.31 0.51 −0.19 −0.03 0.00 −0.02 0.64 0.18 −0.03 0.23
Netherlands 208 −0.31 −1.08 0.13 1.08 0.42 −0.21 0.34 0.05 0.00 0.69 0.10 0.00 0.21


















Panel A: dependent and firm-level variables
N AQ1 AQ2 USLIST GEOSEG OWNER TDISC ANALYST AUDFEE TAXBOOK STSALE NLOSS FINEED LEV
Philippines 118 −0.41 −4.22 0.02 0.19 0.75 1.16 −0.25 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.17 0.02 0.18
Poland 213 −0.56 −1.61 0.05 0.29 0.61 −0.16 −0.24 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.07 0.00 0.19
Portugal 63 −0.39 −0.91 0.10 0.77 0.62 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.52 0.07 0.00 0.37
Singapore 46 −0.35 −1.48 0.08 0.60 0.58 0.24 −0.48 0.00 −0.03 0.28 0.18 0.00 0.16
South Africa 312 −0.38 −1.36 0.13 0.58 0.46 0.45 −0.22 0.00 −0.02 0.46 0.10 −0.05 0.15
Spain 166 −0.38 −0.92 0.05 0.84 0.46 −0.23 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.71 0.07 0.00 0.31
Sweden 407 −0.38 −2.80 0.03 1.12 0.33 −0.21 0.06 0.00 −0.03 0.47 0.20 0.01 0.18
Switzerland 252 −0.31 −1.72 0.04 0.98 0.42 −0.23 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.56 0.12 0.02 0.18
United Kingdom 1303 −0.36 −1.85 0.08 0.59 0.30 0.20 −0.05 0.01 −0.04 0.52 0.21 0.01 0.17
Venezuela 6 −0.38 −0.75 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 −1.11 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.14
Panel B: country-level variables
N INST MACROEC HEDT GOODMAREF FINMARSOPH TECHREAD MARSIZE BUSOPH INN CONCORR GOVEFF REGQUAL RULAW MCTOGDP DOMFIRM FOREIGNTR DIFFER
Australia 1654 5.66 5.39 5.46 5.32 5.87 5.20 4.90 4.81 4.41 2.00 1.90 1.67 1.79 1.89 1.11 0.42 0.40
Austria 94 5.72 5.32 5.40 5.41 5.13 5.17 4.47 5.69 4.76 2.00 1.66 1.61 1.86 1.09 0.28 1.08 −2.50
Belgium 136 5.06 4.90 5.57 5.20 5.37 4.82 4.68 5.44 4.74 1.41 1.76 1.41 1.43 1.13 0.74 1.74 −1.40
Czech
Republic
16 3.84 5.26 4.85 4.65 4.60 4.12 4.38 4.71 3.95 0.32 1.07 1.03 0.73 0.53 0.18 1.52 −0.60
Denmark 157 6.14 5.87 5.96 5.43 5.89 5.64 4.19 5.60 5.11 2.40 2.32 1.86 1.94 1.56 0.61 0.64 −0.10
Finland 207 6.16 5.87 6.01 5.35 5.58 5.36 4.08 5.46 5.67 2.58 2.14 1.75 1.93 1.44 1.33 0.85 −4.40
France 715 5.09 4.93 5.38 5.03 5.20 4.88 5.66 5.47 4.69 1.46 1.33 1.11 1.35 1.19 0.87 0.55 −0.40
Germany 790 5.83 4.93 5.33 5.29 5.64 5.05 5.90 5.93 5.46 1.84 1.66 1.48 1.77 0.93 0.47 0.86 −1.50
Greece 297 4.31 4.29 4.44 4.24 4.41 3.29 4.33 4.13 3.23 0.40 0.58 0.79 0.68 1.46 0.53 0.30 −6.10
Hong Kong 62 5.70 6.13 4.97 5.79 6.23 5.48 4.56 5.28 4.34 1.77 1.80 1.90 1.46 2.17 4.89 4.02 1.50
Hungary 29 4.14 4.22 4.64 4.26 4.64 3.91 4.26 4.35 3.61 0.57 0.80 1.16 0.76 0.69 0.26 1.56 0.30
Ireland 65 5.25 5.69 5.26 5.41 5.91 4.65 4.17 5.07 4.54 1.70 1.61 1.87 1.68 1.09 0.62 1.51 3.30
Italy 301 3.77 4.46 4.55 4.32 3.96 4.37 5.61 4.91 3.45 0.41 0.41 0.85 0.36 0.69 0.47 0.57 −0.70
Luxembourg 26 5.50 5.80 4.40 5.23 5.85 5.38 3.09 4.96 4.18 2.03 1.71 1.84 1.81 1.99 1.38 3.07 −6.00
Netherlands 208 5.73 5.73 5.57 5.37 5.63 5.65 4.95 5.54 4.88 2.06 1.89 1.72 1.74 1.18 0.84 1.41 7.60
Norway 211 5.82 6.10 5.60 5.09 5.61 5.46 4.09 5.19 4.60 2.14 2.11 1.35 2.01 1.65 0.51 0.76 3.80
Philippines 118 3.42 4.70 4.02 4.19 4.06 3.07 4.77 4.20 3.03 −0.78 −0.06 −0.12 −0.48 0.46 0.35 0.90 −1.10
Poland 213 3.65 5.01 4.62 4.12 4.32 3.44 4.88 4.04 3.28 0.19 0.49 0.68 0.25 0.78 0.24 0.83 0.90
Portugal 63 4.87 4.68 4.62 4.59 4.94 4.28 4.28 4.37 3.71 1.09 0.85 1.04 0.94 0.68 0.41 0.72 −2.20
Singapore 46 6.03 5.68 5.42 5.76 6.02 5.36 4.06 5.19 5.08 2.20 2.22 1.76 1.76 2.14 1.82 3.78 4.50
South Africa 312 4.55 5.08 4.12 4.73 5.19 3.57 4.89 4.61 3.71 0.44 0.75 0.62 0.24 0.99 1.63 0.57 3.10
Spain 166 4.46 5.42 4.75 4.59 4.96 4.33 5.36 4.81 3.58 1.16 0.99 1.11 1.08 0.55 0.82 0.59 −4.90
Sweden 407 5.86 5.76 5.98 5.37 5.73 5.87 4.47 5.70 5.53 2.22 2.06 1.53 1.87 1.49 1.11 0.96 0.70
Switzerland 252 5.90 5.69 5.63 5.39 5.40 5.67 4.38 5.80 5.74 2.20 2.17 1.44 1.95 1.74 2.53 1.00 −2.20
United
Kingdom
1303 5.31 5.18 5.42 5.30 6.17 5.27 5.74 5.41 4.79 1.90 1.86 1.88 1.75 1.63 1.40 0.58 3.40




















This table reports mean, median, standard deviation, first quartile, and third quartile of firm-level and country-level
variables used in the regression models. AQ1 measures accounting quality as the negative of the absolute value of
residuals from a regression of 15-month stock returns on earnings and earnings changes. AQ2 measures accounting
quality as the negative of the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from
operations. Accruals are calculated as follows: Δcurrent assets−Δcash−Δcurrent liabilities+Δshort-term debt−
depreciation. USLIST is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a firm lists in a U.S. market, or 0 otherwise. GEOSEG is the
log of the number of geographical segments. OWNER is the percentage of closely held shares. TDISC is the first
principal component of the annual average bid–ask spread and the change in the annual average trading volume.
ANALYST is the first principal component of analyst forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the firm.
AUDFEE is the ratio of total audit fees to total assets. TAXBOOK is the log of the squared difference between pre-tax
book income and taxable income (tax expense divided by the tax rate in the country). STSALE is an indicator taking the
value of 1 if the standard deviation of the firm's sales in the last two years is above the corresponding industry median,
and 0 otherwise. NLOSS is the proportion of years of losses. FINEED is the required investment to grow (two-year
average growth in total assets) minus the proportion of earnings that are reinvested (two-year average ROE/(1−ROE)).
LEV is the ratio of debt to total assets. INST is the country's score for government attitude tomarkets.MACROEC is the
country's score for macroeconomic stability. HEDT is the country's score for level of education. GOODMAREF is a
country score for market efficiency in competition. FINMARSOPH is a country score for financial markets
sophistication. TECHREAD is the country's score for technological readiness. MARSIZE is the country's score for
market size. BUSOPH is the country's score for business sophistication. INN is the country's score for innovation.
CONCORR is the country's score for control of corruption. GOVEFF is the country's score for government
effectiveness. REGQUAL is the country's score for regulatory quality. RULAW is the country's score for rule of law.
MCTOGDP is the average ratio of the country's total market capitalization to its GDP in the period 1997 to 2007.
DOMFIRM is the log of the average ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a country to its population (in
millions) for the period 1997 to 2007. FOREIGNTR is the ratio of the country's exports plus imports to GDP. DIFFER
is Bae et al.'s (2008) country score of difference between the country's local GAAP and IFRS based on 21 accounting
characteristics.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q25 Q75
Panel A: firm-level variables
Earnings per share EAR 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.09
Change in earnings per share ΔEAR 0.01 0.01 0.08 −0.01 0.03
15-Month return RET 0.15 0.07 0.48 −0.19 0.40
Accounting quality 1 AQ1 −0.36 −0.30 0.29 −0.51 −0.15
Accounting quality 2 AQ2 −1.85 −0.51 13.54 −0.86 −0.26
Listing in US markets USLIST 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
International diversification GEOSEG 0.84 0.69 0.64 0.00 1.39
Ownership concentration OWNER 0.35 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.54
Transparency of disclosure TDISC −0.18 −0.23 0.49 −0.43 0.01
Analyst activity ANALYST 0.18 −0.08 0.82 −0.40 0.56
Auditor quality AUDFEE 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Tax-book alignment TAXBOOK −0.01 0.00 0.10 −0.01 0.02
Variability business operations STSALE 0.67 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Economic distress NLOSS 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
External financing needs FINEED 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Debt level LEV 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.32
Observations=2472
Panel B: country-level variables
Government attitude to markets INST 5.30 5.66 0.67 5.09 5.82
Macroeconomic stability MACROEC 5.23 5.18 0.42 4.93 5.39
Education HEDT 5.29 5.42 0.47 5.33 5.46
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Table 2 (continued)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q25 Q75
Market efficiency in competition GOODMAREF 5.12 5.30 0.39 5.03 5.32
Financial markets sophistication FINMARSOPH 5.52 5.64 0.59 5.20 5.87
Technological readiness TECHREAD 4.96 5.20 0.68 4.88 5.27
Market size MARSIZE 5.09 4.90 0.60 4.68 5.74
Business sophistication BUSOPH 5.19 5.41 0.51 4.81 5.47
Innovation INN 4.59 4.69 0.70 4.41 4.88
Control of corruption CONCORR 1.64 1.90 0.68 1.46 2.00
Government effectiveness GOVEFF 1.59 1.86 0.55 1.33 1.90
Regulatory quality REGQUAL 1.44 1.53 0.43 1.11 1.72
Rule of law RULAW 1.49 1.75 0.57 1.35 1.79
Market capitalization to GDP MCTOGDP 1.39 1.49 0.43 0.99 1.74
Domestic listed firms to population DOMFIRM 1.03 1.11 0.59 0.53 1.40
Foreign trade FOREIGNTR 0.73 0.59 0.49 0.55 0.85
Difference to IFRS DIFFER 0.36 0.40 2.75 −1.40 3.10
423H. Isidro, I. Raonic / The International Journal of Accounting 47 (2012) 407–436The first factor shows high loadings for variables REGQUAL, RULAW, CONCORR,
GOVEFF, INST, and FINMARSOPH, which captures the quality of institutional
framework, enforcement, and the efficacy and credibility of public services. Variables
GOODMAREF, HEDT, and TECHREAD also load heavily on factor one and represent
the countries' ability to design cutting-edge products, to adopt existing technologies, to
develop sophisticated business networks that support innovation, and to ensure high
efficiency in the production of goods and services. The quality of institutions overall has a
strong bearing on economic development, competitiveness, and growth. Thus, it is not
surprising that we observe interplay between the two sets of variables that capture the
degree of a country's economic development and the quality of its institutional framework.
We interpret factor one as a relative measure of the country's overall economic and
institutional development and label it DEVELOP.
Factor two depends mostly on BUSOPH, INN, and DOMFIRM. The difference
between domestic GAAP and IFRS (DIFFER) has also some weight in this factor. The
second factor reflects the importance of capital markets to business development, and
business sophistication and innovation. We label this underlying construct as BUSINESS.
Also, variables FOREIGNTR, MARSIZE, MCTOGDP and MACROEC load most
heavily on the third factor. This factor captures the global importance of the country's
economy and its exposure to foreign markets. We label factor three as GLOBAL.
Unlike prior studies that typically classify countries based on single-dimensional
criterion (e.g., legal origin), we use common factors to group countries with similar macro
characteristics. In Table 4, we separate countries that fall into the lower (low-country
factor) and the upper (high-country factor) half of the distribution of each common country
factor. Such an approach identifies underlying commonalities among countries using a
variety of country-level metrics. This enables us to develop more powerful tests of the
interaction between countrywide influences, firm characteristics, and financial reporting
outcomes.
We start with a simple analysis of the variance of firm-level incentives across distinct
country groups. Within each country group, we rank individual firm-level variables and
Table 3
Pairwise correlations.
This table reports pairwise correlations for firm-level (Panel A) and country-level (Panel B) variables used in the regression models. AQ1 measures accounting quality as
the negative of the absolute value of residuals from a regression of 15-month stock returns on earnings and earnings changes. AQ2 measures accounting quality as the
negative of the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from operations. Accruals are calculated as follows: Δcurrent assets−Δcash−
Δcurrent liabilities+Δshort-term debt−depreciation. USLIST is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a firm lists in a U.S. market, or 0 otherwise. The GEOSEG is the log of
the number of geographical segments. OWNER is the percentage of closely held shares. TDISC is the first principal component of the annual average bid–ask spread and
the change in the annual average trading volume. ANALYST is the first principal component of analyst forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the firm.
AUDFEE is the ratio of total audit fees to total assets. TAXBOOK is the log of the squared difference between pre-tax book income and taxable income (tax expense
divided by the tax rate in the country). STSALE is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the standard deviation of the firm's sales in the last two years is above the
corresponding industry median, and 0 otherwise. NLOSS is the proportion of years of losses. FINEED is the required investment to grow (two-year average growth in total
assets) minus the proportion of earnings that are reinvested (two-year average ROE/(1−ROE)). LEV is the ratio of debt to total assets. INST is the country's score for
government attitude to markets. MACROEC is the country's score for macroeconomic stability. HEDT is the country's score for level of education. GOODMAREF is a
country score for market efficiency in competition. FINMARSOPH is a country score for financial markets sophistication. TECHREAD is the country's score for
technological readiness. MARSIZE is the country's score for market size. BUSOPH is the country's score for business sophistication. INN is the country's score for
innovation. CONCORR is the country's score for control of corruption. GOVEFF is the country's score for government effectiveness. REGQUAL is the country's score for
regulatory quality. RULAW is the country's score for rule of law. MCTOGDP is the average ratio of the country's total market capitalization to its GDP in the period 1997
to 2007. DOMFIRM is the log of the average ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a country to its population (in millions) for the period 1997 to 2007.
FOREIGNTR is the ratio of the country's exports plus imports to GDP. DIFFER is Bae et al.'s (2008) country score of the difference between the country's local GAAP
and IFRS based on 21 accounting characteristics. The symbol * against the number indicates statistical significance at the 5% level or less.
Panel A: firm-level variables
AQ1 AQ2 USLIST GEOSEG OWNER TDISC ANALYST AUDFEE TAXBOOK STSALE NLOSS FINEED LEV
AQ1 1
AQ2 0.0295 1
USLIST 0.0826* 0.0339 1
GEOSEG 0.0590* 0.0081 0.1541* 1
OWNER 0.0285 0.0138 −0.1319* −0.0774* 1
CDISC −0.1078* −0.0544* −0.0585* −0.0971* −0.0124 1
ANALYST 0.1334* 0.0507* 0.4006* 0.2916* −0.2195* −0.1934* 1
AUDFEE 0.0380 0.0067 −0.0038 0.0194 0.0166 0.0071 0.0274 1
TAXBOOK 0.0360 −0.0089 −0.0135 0.0818* 0.0248 −0.0963* 0.1174* 0.0001 1
STSALE 0.0200 0.0217 0.1439* 0.1612* −0.0423* −0.1609* 0.3629* 0.0353 0.1305* 1
NLOSS −0.0898* −0.0089 −0.0398* −0.0968* −0.0203 0.1327* −0.2082* −0.0158 −0.4765* −0.2362* 1
FINEED 0.0075 −0.0035 −0.0296 −0.0042 0.0077 0.0098 −0.0204 −0.0006 −0.0269 −0.0041 0.0244 1


















Panel B: country-level variables
INST MACROEC HEDT GOODMAREF FINMARSOPH TECHREAD MARSIZE BUSOPH INN CONCORR GOVEFF REGQUAL RULAW MCTOGDP DOMFIRM FOREIGNTR DIFFER
INST 1
MACROEC 0.6800* 1
HEDT 0.8498* 0.6534* 1
GOODMAREF 0.9271* 0.6599* 0.8251* 1
FINMARSOPH 0.7965* 0.5833* 0.6909* 0.8984* 1
TECHREAD 0.8606* 0.6974* 0.9180* 0.8933* 0.7603* 1
MARSIZE −0.1147* −0.4812* −0.0608* 0.0432* 0.1404* 0.0221* 1
BUSOPH 0.6470* 0.2895* 0.6568* 0.6692* 0.4707* 0.7134* 0.3651* 1
INN 0.8460* 0.4975* 0.8269* 0.8127* 0.6325* 0.8170* 0.1222* 0.9049* 1
CONCORR 0.9507* 0.7137* 0.9230* 0.9260* 0.8336* 0.9410* −0.0580* 0.6379* 0.8196* 1
GOVEFF 0.9372* 0.7491* 0.9113* 0.9393* 0.8743* 0.9251* −0.1104* 0.5946* 0.7977* 0.9768* 1
REGQUAL 0.7852* 0.5494* 0.7816* 0.8683* 0.8909* 0.8394* 0.0996* 0.5065* 0.6397* 0.8928* 0.8907* 1
RULAW 0.9342* 0.6274* 0.9076* 0.9081* 0.8324* 0.9150* 0.0026 0.6408* 0.8049* 0.9800* 0.9626* 0.8988* 1
MCTOGDP 0.2978* 0.4340* 0.1788* 0.4545* 0.4573* 0.3457* −0.1113* 0.1452* 0.2432* 0.3227* 0.3857* 0.3578* 0.2564* 1
DOMFIRM 0.5926* 0.5203* 0.5426* 0.6315* 0.6970* 0.5669* −0.2725* −0.0028 0.2625* 0.6461* 0.7094* 0.6790* 0.6446* 0.5546* 1
FOREIGNTR 0.1460* 0.3023* 0.0624* 0.2382* 0.0657* 0.1728* −0.2708* 0.2494* 0.2133* 0.0987* 0.1356* 0.1095* 0.0712* 0.3455* −0.0421* 1



















Variation of accounting quality and firm incentives by country factor.
This table reports the means for the lowest and highest tercile of firm-level variables for two country groups.
Countries are classified as below median (low) or above median (high) for the corresponding country factor. Tests
of differences in tercile means (p-values) are reported next to the means. Panel A refers to country-factor economic
and institutional development, Panel B refers to country-factor business sophistication and innovation, and Panel
C refers to country-factor global integration of the economy. AQ1 is the negative of the absolute value of residuals
from a regression of 15-month stock returns on earnings and earnings changes. AQ2 is the negative of the ratio of
the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from operations. Accruals are calculated as
follows: Δcurrent assets−Δcash−Δcurrent liabilities+Δshort-term debt−depreciation. GEOSEG is the log of
the number of geographical segments. OWNER is the percentage of closely held shares. TDISC is the principal
component of the annual average bid–ask spread and the change in the annual average trading volume.
ANALYST is the principal component of analyst forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the firm.
AUDFEE is the ratio of total audit fees to total assets. TAXBOOK is the log of the squared difference between
pre-tax book income and taxable income (tax expense divided by the tax rate in the country). NLOSS is the
proportion of years of losses. FINEED is the required investment to grow (two-year average growth in total assets)
minus the proportion of earnings that are reinvested (two-year average ROE/(1−ROE)). LEV is the ratio of debt
to total assets. (Discrete variables USLIST and STSALE are not included.)













Panel A: economic and institutional development
Accounting
quality 1
AQ1 −0.79 −0.08 0.000 −0.73 −0.10 0.000
Accounting
quality 2
AQ2 −10.51 −0.27 0.000 −8.49 −0.25 0.000
International
diversification
GEOSEG 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 1.59 0.000
Ownership
concentration
OWNER 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.18 0.77 0.000
Transparency of
disclosure
TDISC 0.00 0.00 0.000 −0.70 0.63 0.000
Analyst activity ANALYST 0.00 0.00 0.000 −0.60 0.91 0.000
Auditor quality AUDFEE 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.03 0.000
Tax-book
alignment
TAXBOOK −0.15 0.05 0.000 −0.20 0.06 0.000
Economic
distress




FINEED 0.00 0.02 0.000 −0.01 0.02 0.000
Debt level LEV 0.02 0.40 0.000 0.01 0.38 0.000
Panel B: business sophistication and innovation
Accounting
quality 1
AQ1 −0.82 −0.10 0.000 −0.69 −0.09 0.000
Accounting
quality 2
AQ2 −12.54 −0.27 0.000 −6.58 −0.26 0.000
International
diversification
GEOSEG 0.00 1.63 0.000 0.00 1.59 0.000
Ownership
concentration
OWNER 0.14 0.69 0.000 0.13 0.70 0.000
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Table 4 (continued)















TDISC −0.64 0.68 0.000 −0.66 0.61 0.000
Analyst activity ANALYST −0.66 0.68 0.000 −0.64 0.95 0.000
Auditor quality AUDFEE 0.00 0.03 0.000 0.00 0.02 0.000
Tax-book
alignment
TAXBOOK −0.20 0.06 0.000 −0.12 0.05 0.000
Economic
distress




FINEED 0.00 0.02 0.000 −0.01 0.01 0.000
Debt level LEV 0.01 0.39 0.000 0.02 0.39 0.000
Panel C: global integration of economy
Accounting
quality 1
AQ1 −0.80 −0.10 0.000 0.00 −0.10 0.000
Accounting
quality 2
AQ2 −12.22 −0.25 0.000 −6.37 −0.27 0.000
International
diversification
GEOSEG 0.00 1.56 0.000 0.00 1.62 0.000
Ownership
concentration
OWNER 0.12 0.66 0.000 0.16 0.73 0.000
Transparency of
disclosure
TDISC −0.61 0.74 0.000 −0.67 0.51 0.000
Analyst activity ANALYST −0.69 0.65 0.000 −0.59 0.97 0.000
Auditor quality AUDFEE 0.00 0.02 0.000 0.00 0.03 0.000
Tax-book
alignment
TAXBOOK −0.20 0.06 0.000 −0.11 0.05 0.000
Economic
distress




FINEED −0.01 0.02 0.000 0.00 0.02 0.000
Debt level LEV 0.01 0.39 0.000 0.02 0.39 0.000
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highest terciles within a country group. The analysis documents significant differences in
mean values between terciles within country groups, indicating that firms from the same or
similar jurisdictions face different reporting incentives. Thus, these preliminary tests
suggest that firms from countries with similar institutional and economic degrees of
development might not be treated as homogenous groups and that in addition to
countrywide influences, firm-specific incentives are likely to influence accounting quality.
Table 5
The influences of firm-level incentives and country-level institutional factors on accounting quality.
This table reports the results of the individual (columns 3 to 6) and joint (columns 7 and 8) influences of firm
incentives and institutional factors on accounting quality (AQi,t). Variables are defined as follows. AQ1 is the
negative of the absolute value of residuals from a regression of 15-month stock returns on earnings and
earnings changes. AQ2 is the negative of the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value
of cash flow from operations. Accruals are calculated as follows: Δcurrent assets−Δcash−Δcurrent
liabilities +Δshort-term debt−depreciation. USLIST is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a firm lists in a
U.S. market, or 0 otherwise. GEOSEG is the log of the number of geographical segments. OWNER is the
percentage of closely held shares. TDISC is the principal component of the annual average bid–ask spread
and the change in the annual average trading volume. ANALYST is the principal component of analyst
forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following the firm. AUDFEE is the ratio of total audit fees to
total assets. TAXBOOK is the log of the squared difference between pre-tax book income and taxable income
(tax expense divided by the tax rate in the country). STSALE is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the
standard deviation of the firm's sales in the last two years is above the corresponding industry median, and
0 otherwise. NLOSS is the proportion of years of losses. FINEED is the required investment to grow
(two-year average growth in total assets) minus the proportion of earnings that are reinvested (two-year
average ROE / (1−ROE)). LEV is the ratio of debt to total assets. DEVELOP represents country j economic
and institutional development and is measured as the first factor of a factor analysis of 17 country
characteristics. BUSINESS represents country j business sophistication and innovation and is measured as
the second factor of a factor analysis of 17 country characteristics. GLOBAL represents the global importance
of country's j economy and its exposure to foreign markets and is measured as the third factor of a factor
analysis of 17 country characteristics. The t-statistics based on the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimates of
standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. ###, ##, # indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively for a Davidson/
MacKinnon P-test that compares a joint significance of firm- against country-level coefficients and tests whether firm
factors outperform country factors in explaining the response variables AQ1 and ss, respectively.









Variable AQ1 AQ2 AQ1 AQ2 AQ1 AQ2
Listing in US markets USLIST 0.041** 0.591* 0.045*** 0.612**
(2.29) (1.73) (2.64) (2.06)
International operations GEOSEG 0.009 0.007 0.008 −0.075
(0.86) (0.02) (0.85) (−0.19)
Ownership concentration OWNER 0.069** 1.264 0.061** 1.157
(2.48) (1.06) (2.27) (1.03)







(−4.20) (−1.82) (−3.92) (−1.68)
Analyst activity ANALYST 0.038*** 0.860** 0.036*** 0.710**
(4.37) (2.36) (4.38) (2.55)
Auditor quality AUDFEE 0.122** 1.038** 0.123** 0.961**
(2.25) (2.25) (2.27) (2.16)
Tax-book alignment TAXBOOK −0.077 −2.372 −0.069 −2.565








(−2.20) (−0.14) (−2.26) (−0.17)
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Variable AQ1 AQ2 AQ1 AQ2 AQ1 AQ2





(−2.61) (−0.37) (−2.75) (−0.20)
External financing needs FINEED 0.059** 1.164 0.056 −0.332
(2.11) (0.55) (1.57) (−0.26)
Debt level LEV 0.093** 1.397 0.078** 1.163
(2.53) (1.12) (2.20) (0.96)
Economic and institutional
development
DEVELOP 0.004*** 0.224* 0.004* 0.143*
(2.74) (1.68) (1.70) (1.70)
Business sophistication and
innovation
BUSINESS 0.019*** 0.645** 0.003 −0.057
(6.81) (2.34) (0.70) (−0.55)
Global integration of economy GLOBAL 0.015*** 0.657** −0.002 −0.183











(−7.24) (−1.35) (−9.05) (−7.81) (−7.21) (−3.23)
Observations 2472 2374 7854 7283 2472 2374
R-squared 0.072 0.012 0.053 0.001 0.061 0.007
Differences in coefficients on firm-
versus country-level factors
9.285### 3.666###
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We start bymodeling the association between accounting quality measures (AQ1 andAQ2)
and a set of firm-level variables that represent firm reporting incentives.14 We fit the following
regression model:
AQ i;t ¼ β0 þ β1USLISTi;t þ β2GEOSEGi;t þ β3OWNERi;t
þβ4TDISCi;t þ β5ANALYSTi;t þ β6AUDFEEi;t þ β7TAXBOOKi;t
þβ8STSALEi;t þ β9NLOSSi;t þ β10FINEEDi;t þ β11LEVi;t þ μ i;t:
ð4Þ
Following the discussion in Section 2.1, we expect positive coefficients for β2, β3, β5,
and β10 and negative coefficients for β4, β7, β8, and β9; and we make no predictions
regarding β1, β6, and β11.14 We include industry and country ﬁxed effects in the model. Excluding these effects do not materially change
the empirical results.
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accounting quality measures and country j's economic and institutional characteristics:
AQ i;t ¼ γ0 þ γ1DEVELOPj þ γ2BUSINESSj þ γ3GLOBALj þ υi;t: ð5Þ
To the extent that the degree of the country's economic and institutional development,
business sophistication, capital markets development, and international exposure
contribute to a greater quality of corporate financial reporting, we expect to see positive
coefficients for γ1, γ2, and γ3.
The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to investigate the relative importance of
firm reporting incentives and countrywide institutional factors in explaining the quality of
accounting numbers. To do that, we fit a combined firm incentive model (Eq. (4)) and
country-factor model (Eq. (5)), and infer the following about the combined model
coefficients:
AQ i;t ¼ α0 þ β1USLISTi;t þα2GEOSEGi;t þ α3OWNERi;t
þα4TDISCi;t þ α5ANALYSTi;t þα6AUDFEEi;t þ α7TAXBOOKi;t
þα8STSALEi;t þ α9NLOSSi;t þ α10FINEEDi;t þα11LEVi;t
þα12DEVELOPj þ α13BUSINESSj þα14GLOBALj þ εi;t :
ð6Þ
4. Result analysis
Table 5 presents the effects of firm incentives and countrywide institutional factors on
accounting quality.
Columns 3 and 4 report the individual influence of firm-level incentives on accounting
quality (Eq. (4)). We observe that firms listed in U.S. markets (USLIST) report higher
quality accounting numbers, a result that confirms the prediction that firms can improve
their financial reporting by opting to cross-list in the U.S. (coefficients on USLIST are
0.041 and 0.591 for AQ1 and AQ2, respectively). International diversification captured by
GEOSEG does not have a significant association with our measures of accounting quality.
It is possible that the firm's international dimension is captured by other factors considered
in the analysis, such as ANALYST. We find a positive effect of ownership concentration
(OWNER) on the market-based measure of accounting quality. This effect suggests that if
insiders and minority shareholders have shared interests, a firm will have better financial
statements. Coefficients on a firm's disclosure transparency (TDISC) are statistically
significant and have the predicted negative sign (coefficients are −0.053 and −1.478 for
AQ1 and AQ2, respectively). Analyst activity (ANALYST) has a positive association with
accounting quality for the two AQ measures (coefficients are 0.038 and 0.860 for AQ1 and
AQ2, respectively). This association suggests that firms followed by more and
knowledgeable analysts have greater incentives to report better accounting information.
The coefficient on AUDFEE has a positive association with accounting quality
(coefficients are 0.122 and 1.038 for AQ1 and AQ2, respectively). In accordance with
the findings of Larcker and Richardson (2004), this result indicates that firms that pay
proportionally more audit fees benefit from better monitoring of financial information and
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alignment (TAXBOOK) negatively impacts the quality of accounting. A possible
interpretation is that IFRS-based financial information is less responsive to tax influences.
As predicted, higher variability of business operations (STSALE) leads to lower
accounting quality in terms of the ability of earnings to explain stock market returns
(coefficient is −0.028 for AQ1). However, we find no statistical evidence that STSALE
affects reporting quality in terms of earnings management. The existence of losses
(NLOSS) is negatively associated with accounting quality but it is only statistically
significant for AQ1 (coefficient is −0.072). The level of external financing needs
(FINEED) appears to be an important determinant of accounting quality as measured by
AQ1 (coefficient is 0.059). This result supports the idea that firms with insufficient internal
funds to finance business growth need to provide higher quality financial information to
market participants in order to obtain the necessary funds. Leverage (LEV) positively
impacts AQ1, consistent with the roles of debt in monitory financing contracts and in
reducing free cash flow problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Overall, the empirical results
of firm-specific factors suggest that firm operating conditions are strong determinants of
financial reporting quality.15
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 set out the results regarding the individual influence of
country institutional factors on accounting quality (Eq. (5)). Variable DEVELOP that
measures a country's overall economic and institutional development is positive and
statistically significant for the two accounting quality measures. This is consistent with
prior evidence that firms exhibit better accounting quality in countries with strong
institutional frameworks and economic development (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). The
empirical results also show that in countries where business is sophisticated, firms benefit
from innovation and have access to developed capital markets (BUSINESS). Thus,
financial reporting is of higher quality. Furthermore, a positive and statistically significant
coefficient on GLOBAL confirms our argument that accounting quality is higher in
countries well integrated into global markets. Generally, our results provide evidence that
economic, legal, and market conditions play a role in enhancing the quality of accounting
information. This finding suggests that global adoption of IFRS might not achieve the
desired goal of improved financial reporting quality and comparability around the world
unless the country's institutional and economic systems evolve to become more efficient
and comparable.
Results so far confirm prior research that both firm-specific incentives and country
macro-economic conditions are important determinants of accounting quality. More
importantly, we must assess the relative importance of these two sets of factors in
explaining our measures of accounting quality.
Columns 7 and 8 in Table 5 show the empirical results for the combined firm- and
country-factor models (Eq. (6)). The main conclusion is that firm-specific incentives
exhibit a stronger association with accounting quality proxies relative to countrywide
factors. The signs and statistical significance of firm factors remain very similar to those
reported in columns 3 and 4 but the country factors are less or not as statistically15 We tested the impact of early adopters in the regression analysis (both by estimating separate regressions and
by including an indicator variable) and concluded that the overall empirical results remain the same.
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(DEVELOP) are the only country factor that remains important in explaining accounting
quality. We interpreted this as an indication that the general institutional and economic
environments in which firms operate remain an important condition for high-quality
financial reporting. However, macroeconomic conditions are already embedded in the
firm-specific incentives that predominantly determine the quality of reported accounting
numbers.
As a sensitivity analysis, we compare the importance of the two sets of factors.
Specifically, we test the joint significance of coefficients on the firm- against country-level
variables.16 The sensitivity test, reported at the bottom of Table 5, substantiates the
findings discussed above that imply that the country-level factors are to an extent already
reflected in firm-level incentives. It also confirms that once consideration is given to both
sets of influences, the firm-level incentives appear to outperform country-level factors in
explaining the variation in accounting quality. This result confirms the argument this study
presents that individual firms may mitigate the influences of their country-specific
institutional regime by improving their corporate governance quality or opting to list in the
U.S., for example.5. Conclusion
This study is motivated by a large body of international literature that studies the
influence of institutional, economic, and market forces on accounting quality. Most prior
studies (e.g., Ball et al., 2003) examine the influences of institutionally grounded firm
incentives on financial reporting while allowing accounting standards to vary. These
studies thus face issues disentangling their individual influences on the properties of
accounting information. While prior research (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 2006) indicates that
financial reporting behavior is influenced by legal, economic, and enforcement elements of
the firm's environment, it is not clear whether these countrywide forces affect financial
reporting directly or if they shape firms' particular incentives, such as international
diversification and ownership structure that in turn influences reporting quality. More
importantly, research to date offers little insight into the relative importance of firm- versus
country-specific factors for reporting quality.
Our analysis exploits a unique multicountry setting in which firms are required to
comply with an identical set of international reporting standards. This approach allows us
to investigate how institutional factors affect the accounting quality of firms from 26
countries that use the same accounting standards. The sample firms are drawn from a wide
range of institutional and economic contexts that enable us to identify underlying
commonalities among countries using a variety of country-level metrics. Our approach of a
multi-dimensional classification of countries yields potentially more powerful tests for the
association between countrywide factors and accounting quality relative to studies which16 The test we employ is based on the approach developed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) that compares
two competing models (e.g., ﬁrm- against country-level regression) and tests whether one model is superior to
another one in terms of explaining the same response variable. For details of tests of two competing non-nested
models see Cox (1962), and Pesaran and Deaton (1978).
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Furthermore, we do not treat firms in the same country homogenously. In addition to
country-level factors, we consider a set of firm-level incentives and allow for differences
across firms within a country.
We find that financial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong monitoring
mechanisms by means of ownership concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing,
external financing needs, and leverage. Instability of business operations, existence of
losses, and lack of transparent disclosure negatively affect the quality of accounting
information. At the country level, we observe better accounting quality for firms from
regulatory environments with stronger institutions, higher levels of economic develop-
ment, greater business sophistication, and more globalized markets. When the two sets of
factors are combined, we find that firm-specific incentives have a stronger association with
accounting quality. This result suggests that countrywide factors are already reflected in
firm conditions.
Our findings provide two important conclusions. First, we show that a significant part of
institutional and economic features is reflected in firm-specific conditions. This result
suggests that policy-makers can improve accounting quality by implementing reforms in
institutional systems that are capable of changing business conditions at the firm level.
Moreover, firm managers might be able to reduce the influence of the institutional features
in which they operate on financial reporting by changing firm-specific conditions. Second,
our evidence supports the view that despite the global adoption of a single set of
accounting standards, significant differences in accounting quality across individual firms
persist because firms face different market forces, institutional incentives, and business
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